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THE UNITED STATES ARBITRATION ACT
-A REEVALUATION
HERBERT BURSTEIN

t

LABOR ARBITRATION is collective bargaining carried on by
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial means. It is designed, primarily, to preserve the integrity of a labor contract and to assure the
peace which it promises. When an arbitrator closes the interstices
of an agreement by translating ambiguous clauses into enforceable
rules and regulations or declares the rights of the parties,'. he is engaged
in legislation or adjudication and, of course, industrial diplomacy.
This salutary process is frustrated if the contestants are unwilling
to be bound by the award or cannot be compelled to accept it. Rejection
of the award means, almost inevitably, a transition from a cold war into
the heat of a strike or a lock-out. Hence, an effective, even if not an
ideal, arbitral system presupposes a comprehensive statutory framework which includes, among other things, efficient procedures for
judicial enforcement. This has been achieved under many state statutes which establish agencies or prescribe methods for the settlement of
labor disputes through the medium of arbitration.
However, despite the prevalence of arbitration clauses in labor
agreements and the development of a federal substantive law of labor
relations, and notwithstanding that the federal courts are rapidly becoming the principal forums for the resolution of labor disputes, a
specific federal labor arbitration statute has not been adopted. Instead,
litigants and the courts have relied upon the United States Arbitration
Act 2 as a statutory basis for the enforcement of arbitration agreements
involving labor disputes. Unfortunately, there is no unanimous agreet Partner in the firm of Zelby & Burstein, New York, A.B. 1936, Long Island
University; LL.B. 1938, J.S.D. 1942, St. Lawrence University.
1. Arbitration concerning the "rights" of the parties under an existing agreement

is to be distinguished from arbitration of the terms of a collective labor agreement or
the arbitration of "interests." Cf. Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press,
241 F.2d 787 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 78 Sup. Ct. 21 (1957).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1952).

(125)
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ment on the part of the courts and the bar that the Arbitration Act
applies to labor disputes." On the contrary, the Arbitration Act has
been the source of a decisional history which matches, if it does not
surpass, the "checkered career" of commercial arbitration.'
The
seemingly hopeless conflict of opinions among the federal courts has not
been reconciled by the exiguous contribution of the United States Supreme Court in this field. It is true, of course, that the Supreme Court
has sanctioned the enforcement of arbitration clauses in collective
bargaining agreements in suits instituted under section 301 (a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.' The Supreme Court has
held that section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act is
more than jurisdictional; that it does, in fact, authorize "federal
courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these
collective bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law
specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agreements." 6 In short, since section 301 (a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act "is more than jurisdictional," the
procedural route for enforcing arbitration agreements is marked out
in section 301(b).
It is evident, therefore, that either an employer or a union may
institute suit for violation of a collective bargaining agreement, and
elect either to recover damages or to compel specific performance of
the promise to arbitrate.7 Left undecided, however, is this question:
whether in a suit, under section 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, to recover damages rather than to compel arbitration,
the defendant may stay the action pending arbitration.'
The issue
suggested by this question may be illustrated by a hypothetical problem: a union and an employer, whose employees produce goods for
3. See Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARv. L. Rrv. 591
(1954) ; Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. Rev. 999

(1955).
4. See Note, Commercial Arbitration and the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REv.
902 (1956).
5.61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952).
6. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); General Electric
Co., v. Local 205, United Electrical Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957) ; Goodall-'Sanford,
Inc. v. United Textile Workers, AFL-CIO, 353 U.S. 550 (1957).
7. In a recent case, a federal district court held that picketing in violation of a
no-strike clause may be enjoined as part of an order compelling specific performance
of an arbitration agreement. Bull Steamship Co. v. Seafarers' Union, 40 L.R.R.M.
2646 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), rev'd, 41 L.R.R.M. 2121 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 78 Sup.
Ct. 411 (1958).
8. Undecided, too, is the question whether an individual employee may institute
suit in a federal court to compel specific performance of a promise to arbitrate grievances. The Supreme Court has held that an individual employee may not institute suit
under section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act to recover unpaid wages.
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348
U.S. 437 (1955).
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sale in interstate commerce, are parties to a collective labor agreement.
Among other things, the labor agreement provides for arbitration of
disputes and grievances concerning the interpretation, application, and
enforcement of the agreement. When the employer subcontracts a
portion of his work, the union charges the former with a violation of
the agreement and calls a strike. The employer then institutes suit
under section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act to
recover damages for breach of contract and the union moves for a stay
of the action pending arbitration.
It may, perhaps, be contended that when the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, it can entertain a motion
under section 301 (b) to stay the suit pending arbitration. Alternatively, the union may counterclaim for arbitration. But it is questionable that either procedure would sanction an order staying the suit.
Clearly, the Labor Management Relations Act does not, by its terms,
contemplate either a motion to stay the suit or a stay accomplished by
the counterclaim in the answer. Under typical state arbitration statutes, a stay of the suit is secured by a motion made in accordance with
the express provisions of the arbitration law of the state. For example,
if an action is instituted in the courts of the State of New York to
recover damages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the
defendant must affirmatively move under section 1451 of the Civil
Practice Act ' for an order staying the action pending arbitration. In
other words, the arbitration law of the State of New York 10 prescribes
an express procedure for compelling arbitration or for staying an action
pending arbitration. If the appropriate procedural steps are not followed by the defendant, the courts will not sua sponte stay the action,
and the case will proceed to trial and judgment.
Analogy would indicate that if an action is instituted under section
301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, the defendant must
affirmatively move for a stay of the action under the federal Arbitration
Act. Section 301 (b) does not appear to provide the remedy of a stay
pending arbitration. If it does, however, then the federal Arbitration
Act, at least in the area of labor arbitration, has become moribund.
This may explain the refusal by the Supreme Court to review cases
which pose squarely the question of the applicability of the federal
Arbitration Act to collective bargaining agreements."
Until the
9. N.Y. Civ. PRnc. AcT, Art. 84, § 1451.
10. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT, Art. 84, §§ 1448-69.
11. Local 19, Warehouse Workers Union, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, CIO v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776 (6th Cir. 1956), Cert. denied, 354
U.S. 910 (1957) ; Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union, 235 F.2d 108
(7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 912; Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United
Electrical Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957).
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Supreme Court announces its position, it is reasonable to assume that
the federal Arbitration Act is not a legislative dodo and that in an
appropriate case the Court will act. Consequently, an inquiry into the
origin, scope and purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act may
adumbrate the important issues which must be resolved.
I.
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT.

The United States Arbitration Act is a short and relatively simple
statute. Its principal provisions are found in sections 1, 2, 3, and 4.12
Briefly stated, the Arbitration Act provides for the enforcement of (a)
agreements to arbitrate future controversies arising out of (1) "any
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce," or (2) "the refusal to perform the whole or any part" of
the transaction or contract, and (b) a written agreement to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of "such a contract,
transaction or refusal." Excluded from the ambit of application of the
Arbitration Act are "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." "a If the issue involved in any suit or proceeding
instituted in a federal court is "referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration," the suit or proceeding may be
stayed pending arbitration by a motion under section 3 of the Arbitration Act. Further, if one party to the contract or transaction fails, refuses or neglects to proceed to arbitration, the aggrieved party may
petition, under section 4 of the Arbitration Act, for an order directing
arbitration:
"If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure,
neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall
proceed summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial be demanded
by the party alleged to be in default, or if the matter in dispute is
within admiralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine
such issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be
in default may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the
return day of the notice of application, demand a jury trial of
such issue, and upon such demand the court shall make an order
referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner provided by
law for referring to a jury issues in an equity action, or may
specially call a jury for that purpose."
12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1952).
13. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
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Accordingly, in the hypothetical case, if the union elects to proceed
under section 3, the jurisdictional requirement incorporated in section
4, namely, that the federal court have jurisdiction "under the judicial
code at law, in equity, or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit
arising out of the controversy between the parties," is not a bar. In
any event, the court would have jurisdiction of the suit since it was
instituted under section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, and the requirement for diversity of citizenship and amount in
controversy is expressly waived. However, in order to proceed under
section 3 and thereby to stay the action, the union must prove: (a)
either that the exclusion in section 1 of the Arbitration Act does not
apply because a collective labor agreement is not a contract of employment or if the collective labor agreement is held to be a contract of
employment, the exclusion is limited to contracts of employment of
workers directly engaged in interstate commerce and not in the production of goods for commerce; and (b) that the dispute is arbitrable.
Whether or not the union will prevail may depend upon its choice
of a forum, since the several courts of appeals and the federal district
courts are sharply divided. 4 Although a construction of the Arbitration
Act based upon its legislative history appears to support those who
argue that Congress enacted only a commercial arbitration statute," it
has been argued that the scanty history is inconclusive and unreliable.
II.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.

The American Bar Association recommended the enactment of
the federal Arbitration Act in 1918 and a draft of a proposed law was
prepared by its Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial
Law.'" In December 1922, a bill was introduced in the Senate and in
the House 17 which did not incorporate the exclusionary language now
14. Conflict of opinion is reflected by decisions of federal courts within the same
circuit as well as among courts of appeals.

15. Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Electrical Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d
Cir. 1956); Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, CIO, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.
1956); United Electrical Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th
Cir. 1954); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n. of Street
Employees, 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Amalgamated Ass'n. of Street Employees v.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951); Shirley-Herman
Co. v. International Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1950) ; International Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d
33 (4th Cir. 1948) ; see, Local 19, Warehouse Workers Union, CIO v. Buckeye Cotton
Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776 (6th Cir. 1956) ; Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union,
AFL, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Mercury Oil Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l. Union, CIO,
187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951).
16. 50 A.B.A. RZr. 356-62 (1925).
17. S. 4214, H.R. 13522, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1922).
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contained in section 1. Vigorous objection to the bill was voiced by
Andrew Furuseth, President of the International Seamen's Union of
America, who charged that it constituted a "compulsory labor" bill.
The American Federation of Labor filed protests against the bill and
has claimed that its intervention and protest resulted in the adoption of the exclusionary language of section 1 which "exempts labor
from the provisions of the law." 18
Later, at hearings on the proposed act, a spokesman for the
American Bar Association reassured labor representatives by stating
that the bill was not designed "to make an industrial arbitration in any
sense," and by suggesting language substantially like that of the
exclusionary clause in section 1.19
Senator Sterling, then Chairman of the Subcommittee, apparently
acknowledged that the purpose of the proposed amendment submitted
by the American Bar Association was to restrict the law to commercial
arbitration.'
The bill was not enacted. In December 1923 a new bill was introduced in the House and in the Senate which added the exclusionary
language now incorporated in section 1.21 The testimony at the hearings and floor debate indicates persuasively that the bill was intended
to apply to commercial arbitration only. The absence of labor representatives from the hearings appears to support this conclusion. Moreover, the Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary emphasized the fact that the House bill was designed to "give an opportunity
to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty contracts" 22 and this was confirmed by Congressman Mills of New York,
who had sponsored the bill in the House.'
The reports of both the
House and the Senate Committees 24 and the support of the Department of Commerce 25 reaffirmed the general understanding that the
act was a commercial arbitration law.
18. Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of the International
Seamen's Union of America, 203 (1923); Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual
Convention of the American Federation of Labor, 52 (1925).
19. Hearing Before A Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, on S.
4213 and S. 4214, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923).
20. Id. at 10.
21. Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary,
on S.1005 and H.R. 647, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).

22. 65 CONG. Ric. 1931 (1924).
23. 65 CONG. Rc. 11,080 (1924).
24. H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) ; S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1924).
25. The Department issued a statement in 1925 quoting then Secretary Hoover as
follows: "'Information collected by the Department of Commerce over the past several
years' he said, 'clearly showed that the substantial element -of the American business
public is overwhelmingly in favor of arbitration in the settlement of commercial dis-
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One further clue to congressional intention is provided by a study
of the arbitration statutes in effect at the time when the federal act was
adopted. Manifestly, the federal Arbitration Act was modeled, in the
main, upon the 1920 New York Arbitration Law 26 and that law was
intended to apply to commercial arbitration exclusively.
In.1940, section 1448 of the Civil Practice Act of New York was
amended, to read, in part:
"A provision in a written contract between a labor organization, as defined in subdivision five of section seven hundred one
of the labor law, and employer or employers or association or
group of employers to settle by arbitration a controversy or controversies thereafter arising between the parties to the contract including but not restricted to controversies dealing with rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment or other terms and conditions of
employment of any employee or employees of such employer or
employers shall likewise be valid, enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 27
In 1952, the New York law was further amended to provide that the
terms of a new collective bargaining agreement could be submitted to
arbitration,2" but no similar change was made in the federal Arbitration
Act.2 9 Indeed, efforts to expand the Arbitration Act to embrace labor
disputes consistently failed. In 1926, the American Bar Association,
through its Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law,
proposed the adoption of a bill applicable to labor disputes 8 and a draft
of such a bill was submitted by the Association."' The proposed bill
was opposed by the American Federation of Labor, and the American
Bar Association decided not to press for its adoption. 2
An attempt was made again in 1942 to amend the Arbitration
Act, and a bill, drafted by a Committee of the American Arbitration
putes in both domestic and foreign trade. In addition, 'it has the approval and support
of leading members of the bar throughout the United States.' In the field of waste
elimination, it comprises another important advance, according to the Secretary, and,
as a result, he says, that he has 'encouraged every reasonable movement in making

arbitration accessible to merchants everywhere.' " (Quoted in Cohen & Dayton, The
New Federal ArbitrationLaw, 12 VA. L. RZv. 266, 285 (1926).
26. Nordlinger, The Law and Practice of Arbitration in New York, 13 Mo. L.
Rv. 196 (1948) ; In re Buffalo & Erie Ry., 250 N.Y. 275, 165 N.E. 291 (1929).
27. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1940, c. 851.
28. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1952, c. 757.
29. 61 STAT. 669 (1947), as amended, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). The only change
effected was the addition to section one of the catchline: "'Maritime Transactions' and
commerce' defined; exceptions to operation of title."
30. 51 A.B.A. Rls. 394 (1926).
31. 53 A.B.A. RP. 376 (1928).
32. 55 A.B.A. Rzi'. 328 (1930).
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Association, was introduced in the Senate.88 This bill would have
sanctioned the enforcement of arbitration agreements between unions
or other representatives of employees and employers 34 but it never
reached the Senate floor. When the 1947 Congress codified the act
as Title 9, no effort was made to include labor arbitration. Indeed,
when the Arbitration Act was codified, one court of appeals had ruled
that the exclusionary language in section 1 included a collective bargaining agreement and, hence, that the act was not applicable to a
collective bargaining agreement.'
Legislative history is not always a reliable guide to congressional
intention. However, the objectives of legislation are frequently revealed by a search into the social climate and the economic dynamics
of the time when the law was enacted. Here, too, the evidence points
to an exclusively commercial arbitration law. The characteristic sign
of the 1920's was the rising tide of American capitalism, the expansion
of an industrial economy, and aggressive anti-unionism. The alleged
alliance, whether real or illusory, between government and business
during this period, did not inspire confidence, on the part of labor, in
the impartial processes of government. Organized labor was then
vigorously resisting compulsory arbitration statutes which had been
It is
adopted or were in the process of adoption by various states."
understandable, therefore, that the labor movement and each of its
segments believed that arbitration was undesirable, if not dangerous.
consistently opposed the
Indeed, the American Federation of Labor
87
adoption of any labor arbitration statute.
There are, of course, divergent views on the legislative history
and the catalogue of abstracts from debates and reports apparently does
not impress those who contend that the Arbitration Act applies to
They urge,
industrial disputes under collective labor agreements.
first, that a collective bargaining agreement is not a contract of employment; secondly, that labor's opposition to the inclusion of arbitration of
labor disputes must be understood to apply only to individual contracts
of hire for personal service, under which seamen were employed in the
1920's, and not to collective bargaining agreements; and, third, that
the exclusion in section 1 applies only to employees directly engaged
in interstate commerce and not to those who are employed in the production of goods for commerce. One thing is clear: organized labor
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

S. 2350, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945).
88 CONG. R~c. 2072 (1942).
Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944).

Wrrn,

HISTORICAL SURVEY or LABOR ARBITRATION, 39-43 (1952).

TzLLIR, A LABOR POLICY

FOR

AmmaucA, 172 (1945).
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had encouraged and relied upon collective bargaining agreements and
it seems doubtful that the opposition of the American Federation of
Labor would have been limited to individual contracts. It is true, of
course, that the "yellow dog" contract was the principal target of
organized labor's economic and legislative efforts. The unions' experience with governmental intervention had not been a happy one but
the trade union movement was threatened with even graver consequences by challenges to collective action. This was the day when
the Supreme Court disabused those who had hailed the Clayton Act "s
as a magna carta for labor."9 Business unionists who wanted to keep
labor out of politics desired, even more, to keep politics and government out of labor relations. It is fair to suggest, therefore, that any
scheme of federal arbitration would be a signal for opposition by organized labor. Certainly, it cannot be effectively argued that the organized
trade union movement understood the Arbitration Act to be applicable
to collective bargaining agreements while individual contracts of employment were excluded.
Finally, even if a collective bargaining agreement is not treated
as a contract of employment, within the meaning of the exclusionary
language in section 1, there is one further hurdle which must be overcome. Section 2 makes reference to a "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce." How does one square the concept of a
collective bargaining agreement with the language "contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce"? If anything, it cannot be reconciled. The legislative history of the act shows that this key phrase
was inserted as a substitute for the earlier "transaction involving commerce" in order to preclude any construction that the bill applied to
labor contracts as well as to commercial transactions.4°
The overriding fact remains that the legislative history has been
read differently by different courts, and the United States Supreme
Court has provided no definitive guide. Of course, Mr. Justice Frankfurter read the majority opinion in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills as rejecting "the availability of the Federal Arbitration Act to
enforce arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements," 41
but this obviously is not a rule of law binding on the federal courts.
38. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 ST'AT. 730 (codified in scattered sections of 15,
18, 28, 29 U.S.C.).
39. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n., 274 U.S. 37
(1927) ; United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926) ; Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
40. Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary

on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924).
41. 353 U.S. 448, 466 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
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Since neither the text of the statute nor the legislative history has
produced a harmony of opinions, courts have resorted to other aids
to construction. The consequence has been a miscellany of conflicting
decisions.
III.
THE ARBITRATION ACT IN

THE COURTS.

Unquestionably the primary cause for conflict is the lack of
agreement about the status of the collective bargaining agreement.42
Surely, if the courts agreed that a collective labor agreement is a contract of employment, the conflict would be narrowed. But there is no
such unanimity of opinion.
Courts which hold that a collective labor agreement is not a contract of employment rely, principally, upon the decision in J. I. Case
Co. v. NLRB,"8 in which the Supreme Court said, in effect, that a collective bargaining agreement is a trade agreement analogous to a tariff
of rates and charges published by carriers, rather than a contract of
employment. One appellate court, however, has pointed out that the
J. I. Case doctrine is not determinative of the question under the United
States Arbitration Act.4 4 Indeed, in another context, the United States
Supreme Court has referred to collective bargaining agreements as
"employment contracts." ""
The controversy, however, does not terminate with the conclusion
that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract of employment.
In Tenney Engineering,Inc. v. United ElectricalWorkers, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled that while a collective bargaining agreement is a contract of employment, the exclusion in section 1
of the Arbitration Act applies only to employees specifically identified
therein, namely, seamen and railroad workers and others directly engaged in interstate commerce.4 6 This presupposes, however, that Congress legislated a distinction between employees engaged in commerce
and those engaged in the production of goods for commerce. It has
42. See Burstein, Enforcement of Collective Labor Agreements by the Courts, 6th
Annual Conference on Labor (N.Y.U.) 31 (1953) ; Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 HARV. L. Rgv. 572 (1931) ; Wittmer, Collective Agreements in the Contracts,48 YALe L.J. 229 (1938).
43. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).

44. Amalgamated Ass'n. of Street Employees v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951).
45. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., Inc., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co. 306 U.S. 332, 342 (1939). Throughout the debates on the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1945, collective bargaining agreements were referred to
as employment contracts. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1947).
46. 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
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been argued that if the federal Arbitration Act was intended to govern
industrial disputes, the impact on interstate commerce of a strike or
work stoppage is no less a matter of national concern where it involves
employees engaged in producing goods for interstate commerce, than
where it is restricted to employees who are engaged directly in interstate commerce. Such a differentiation has not been expressed in
other vital labor legislation. On the contrary, Congress and the courts
have sedulously avoided an atomization of workers in the National
Labor Relations Act both in the original and amended texts. Thus
far, the principle of the Tenney case has failed to win widespread
acceptance.47

The early labor cases which turned on the Arbitration Act were
not within the typical dispute category. Thus, in 1943, the Third
Circuit held that section 3 of the Arbitration Act was not limited by
section 2 and, accordingly, granted a stay in a suit under the Fair Labor
Standards Act."' In 1944, the Sixth Circuit held that section 1 did
apply to section 3 of the act and denied a stay of arbitration.49 In
other words, the occasion for conflict was primarily a difference of
views concerning the interrelationships between section 1, 2, and 3
of the Arbitration Act. Hence, one court which treated section 3 as
an independent provision would grant a stay if it was "satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding [was] referable to arbitration"
under an agreement in writing which provided "for such arbitration." 50
It was, consequently, of no moment whether or not a collective labor
agreement was a contract of employment. Another court, on the
other hand, treating sections 1 and 3 as integral parts of a single statute
would deny a stay if the exclusionary language in section 1 were
operative.51

One appellate court dealt squarely with the problem. In Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
47. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has adopted the Tenney doctrine.
Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Electrical Workers, 235 F.2d 298, 302 (2d
Cir. 1956).
48. Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943); see also
Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 777
(1946) (where it was held that the exclusion in section 1 did not reach into section 3) ;
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 160 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1948).
49. Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944). In 1944, the Fourth
Circuit, in Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854 (1944), adopted
the rule enunciated in the first Donahue case, supra note 48, but reversed its position
in 1948. Thus, in International Union, United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948), and in United Electrical Workers v.
Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954), the Gatliff rule was adopted.
50. Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854 (1944).
51. United Electrical Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th
Cir. 1954).
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Inc., 2 Judge Hastie construed the catchline added by the 1947 codification of the federal Arbitration Act as a congressional signal to read
section 3 and section 1 as integrated parts of a single statute. This
controversy was finally settled by the United States Supreme Court in
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.," which read sections 1, 2, and 3 as
interrelated parts of the statute.
Four cases, decided by federal appellate courts, highlight the conflict of construction.
In International Union United Furniture
Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., suit was instituted
under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act. The
Union moved for a stay of arbitration on the ground that the contract
required arbitration of the matters in suit. The district court denied
the stay on the ground, among others, that the contract did not provide
for arbitration of such matters. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that:
"the arbitration clause embedded in Art. IV, as one of the subsections of section 2, has relation to the controversies which are
made the subject of grievance procedure of that article, and not to
claims for damages on account of strikes and secondary boycotts,
which are matters entirely foreign thereto. Damages arising
from strikes and lockouts could not reasonably be held subject to
arbitration under a procedure which expressly forbids strikes and
lockouts and provides for the settlement of grievances in order
that they may be avoided. It would have been possible, of
course, for the parties to provide for the arbitration of any dispute
which might arise between them; but they did not do this, and
the rule noscitur a sociis applies to the arbitration clause in the
grievance procedure to limit its application to controversies to
which the grievance procedure was intended to apply." "
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the same
conclusion in Cuneo Press v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union. Here,
too, the Union sought a stay order under section 3 of the Arbitration
Act after they had called a sit-down strike and the employer instituted
suit. The court there said:
52. 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cr. 1951).

53. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
54. 168 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1948). See also United Electrical Workers v. Miller
Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Bassick Co. v. Bassick Local, 229,
126 F. Supp. 777 (D. Conn. 1954) ; Square D Co. v. United Electrical Workers, 123
F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Mich. 1954) ; Metal Polishers Union, AFL v. Rubin, 85 F. Supp.
363 (E.D. Pa. 1949). Contra, Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated
Ass'n. of Street Employees, 98 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Pa. 1951), rezld on other grounds.
193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers, CIO, 95
F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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"If the unions had grievances, it is apparent that they ignored
the grievance procedure, as well as the provision for arbitration.
Instead they instituted a sit down strike which was disruptive of
plaintiff's business and the work of its employees. The action
was in direct conflict with the arbitration procedure called for
by the contract.

.

.

. The unions chose to act suddenly and

without warning in using the economic force or pressure of a sit
down strike. Obviously, a chief purpose of the arbitration agreement was to avoid a strike. When the unions embarked upon the
strike, they voluntarily by-passed arbitration. When they struck
the wrong was done and the damage to plaintiff began. Then it
was that plaintiff's right of action for damages and injunctive relief to prevent further damage accrued.
"Even if the unions originally had an issue referable to arbitration,
they chose instead to resolve that issue in their favor by use of
their economic strength. Having thus violated their contract to
plaintiff's damage, it was too late for them to demand arbitration
on that issue."
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in International Union, United Automobile Workers v.
Benton Harbor Malleable Industries.5"
Directly opposed to these opinions is the decision by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475,
United Electrical Workers. 7 The court there held:
"We think the broad arbitration clause in the collective
bargaining agreement here involved covers a dispute relating to an
alleged breach of the no-strike clause. Under the agreement, 'All
disputes, grievances or differences' are arbitrable. We can hardly
imagine more broadly inclusive language. This phraseology distinguishes the instant case from Markel Electric Products, Inc.
v. United Electric, Radio & Machine Workers, [202 F.2d 435
(2d Cir. 1953)]. To the extent that the other cases cited by
plaintiff require a contrary result, we think them erroneous. We
think their interpretations of similar arbitration clauses are unduly restrictive and achieve, by indirection, the same result as the
old, and now generally rejected, judicial aversion to enforcing
arbitration agreements. Cf. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 2 Cir., 126 F.2d 978, 983-85. Other cases, with
which we agree, support our decision that the instant arbitration
55. 235 F.2d 108, 111 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 912. Cf. Young Constr.
Co. v. Plumbers Union, 40 L.R.R.M. 2623 (E.D. Ill. 1957).
56. 242 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1957) ; see, also, Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1954).
57. 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956).
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agreement covers a dispute arising from an alleged breach of the
no-strike clause. See, e.g., Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture
Workers of America, CIO, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 95 F. Supp. 851, 85354; Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n, etc.,
D.C., 98 F. Supp. 789, 791, reversed on other grounds, 3 Cir.,
193 F.2d 327; Hudson Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Allied Trades
Council, N.J. Ch., 3 N.J. Super. 327, 65 A.2d 557, 559."
Additionally, the court adopted the reasoning of the Tenney case."
The Tenney case illustrates the judicial gyrations which are perhaps
inevitable under the Arbitration Act. Originally the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, in Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 9
and in Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co.,' ° read section 3 as distinct from
section 1, although the court did not decide whether a collective bargaining agreement was a contract of employment. Then, in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc.," the court concluded that a collective bargaining agreement was
a contract of employment and that' the Arbitration Act did not apply.
Then later, in the Tenney case," the court modified its views so as to
extend the stay provisions of the Arbitration Act to collective bargaining agreements involving employees not directly employed in interstate
commerce.
A possible conflict exists also in the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit although that court has rejected the claim of conflict 63
and the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court
may be read as supporting that conclusion, despite the injunction by the
Supreme Court that a denial of certiorari is not to be construed as
an expression of opinion by that Court.
In Markel Electric Products, Inc. v. United Electrical Workers,
the employer instituted an action under section 301 (a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act alleging a breach of contract by reason of
a strike in violation of the no-strike clause. The Union denied that it
had violated the agreement and moved for an order staying proceedings
pending arbitration. The arbitration clause referred to differences
"between the company and any employee" and to "any trouble of any
kind" which might arise in the plant. The court, affirming the order
58. Id. at 302.
59. 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943).
60. 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 777 (1946).
61. 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951).
62. 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
63. Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Electrical Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d
Cir. 1956). A petition for rehearing en banc was denied by the court.
64. 354 U.S. 911 (1957).
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denying the Union's motion for a stay pending arbitration, held that
the dispute was not contemplated by the arbitration clause:
"[W]e do not think that the dispute here involved is within
the scope of the arbitration clause. The whole tenor of the contract was to lay a groundwork of agreement as to wages, hours
and conditions of employment and to provide a peaceful method
for the settlement of grievances and disputes over the meaning and
application of the agreement with respect to those matters. If
efforts in accordance with the procedure of Article VIII proved
to be ineffective, resort might be had to Article IX, which provided
that an unsettled dispute or grievance was to be submitted to arbitration '. . . upon written notice of the party filing the grievance
• . to be served upon the other party within five (5) days
,after the meeting referred to in the third step of the grievance
procedure outlined above.' The quoted language shows clearly
that arbitration was to be but a fourth step in the grievance
procedure, and as such the subject matter to which it is applicable
is no broader than that to which the first three steps applied. The
dispute as to whether the union was justified in calling the strike
is one certainly not capable of resolution at a conference between
an employee or a department steward, or both, and a department
foreman; or between the chief steward and the general superintendent. It is, therefore, not the kind of dispute which was intended to be resolved by submission to arbitration." 65
The whole problem appeared to have been brought into focus in
a decision by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Local 205
United Electrical Workers v. General Electric Co. 8 In that case, the
Union filed two grievances which the company insisted were not
arbitrable. One involved the job classification of an employee alleged
to be doing work calling for a rate higher than he was receiving and
the other related to the discharge of an employee for refusing to do
work claimed to be beyond his regular duties. The question presented
was whether a federal district court had authority under section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act to compel an employer to
submit the grievances to arbitration. The District Court dismissed
the complaint" 7 but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
jurisdiction to compel arbitration is not withdrawn by the NorrisLaGuardia Act. The court then held that in an action under section
301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act federal, not state, law
determines whether the remedy of specific performance of an agreement
to arbitrate was available. However, said the court, the Labor Manage65. 202 F.2d 435, 437 (2d Cir. 1953).
66. 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956).
67. 129 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass 1955).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1958], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 3: p. 125

ment Relations Act did not provide a statutory basis for enforcing
executory agreements to arbitrate. The appropriate vehicle was the

federal Arbitration Act, according to the First Circuit.
The decision was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court
which affirmed the decision but did not follow the procedural route
proposed by the First Circuit. Indeed, the affirmance rested on a
ground expressly rejected by the court of appeals and the majority
avoided a decision on the Arbitration Act.
The applicability of the United States Arbitration Act to collective
bargaining agreements was also raised and similarly treated in Textile

Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,s Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United
Textile Workers, AFL-CIO,6" and United States Steel Workers, CIO
v. Galland-HenningMfg. Co. 70
A week later, following the decisions in the three landmark cases,
certiorari was denied in Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Local 19, Warehouse Workers Union, CIO, and Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475,
United Electrical Workers.7'
Earlier in the Term, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union.7'

The con-

sequences of denialof certiorari are these: the Supreme Court has left
standing a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
which holds that a strike does constitute a waiver of the right to demand
arbitration; ' a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
which holds that the United States Arbitration Act specifically authorizes specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate; 74 and a
decision that a strike does not constitute a waiver of the right to
arbitration.75
If the United States Supreme Court ultimately grants certiorari in
a case which once again raises the issue of the applicability of the
United States Arbitration Act to collective bargaining agreements, the
following possibilities are presented:
(a) the Court may decide that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract of employment absolutely excluded under
section 1 of the Arbitration Act so that the nature of the employment is immaterial;
68. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
69. 353 U.S. 550 (1957).
70. 241 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1957).

71. 354 U.S.911 (1957).
72. 352 U.S. 912 (1956).
73. See note 53 supra.
74. 236 F.2d 776 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957).
75. See note 56 supra.
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(b) the Court may hold that the collective bargaining agreement is a contract of employment excluded by section 1 of the
Arbitration Act only when it involves workers directly engaged
in interstate commerce;
(c) the Court may hold that the collective bargaining agreement is not a contract of employment and so long as it evidences
a transaction in commerce it is subject to the provisions of sections
3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act;
(d) the Court may decide that although a collective bargaining agreement is not a contract of employment for the purposes
of the Arbitration Act, a stay will not be ordered if the employer
institutes an action under the Labor Management Relations Act
and elects to recover damages rather than to enforce arbitration;
(e) the Court may decide that a collective bargaining agreement is not a contract of employment and a suit to recover
damages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause must be stayed under section 3 of the
Arbitration Act, since arbitration is the sole remedy of the plaintiff
and section 301 (b) authorizes a motion for a stay.
To be sure, it is idle to speculate on the possible outcome of such
litigation. Indeed, it is even possible that the Supreme Court will not
reach these questions before the act is amended.7 6
76. On January 28, 1958 a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives
to extend the provisions of the United States Arbitration Act to labor contracts.
H.R. 10,308, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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